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DECREEING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE:
JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OF PUBLIC
INSTITUTIONS*
DONALD L. HOROWITZ**
In the lastfifteen years or so, courts have issued a small but signifi-
cant number of decrees requiring that governmental bodies reorganize
themselves so that their behavior will comport with certain legal stan-
dards. Such decrees, addressed to school systems, prison and mental
hospital officials, welfare administrators, andpublic housing authorities,
insert trial courts in the ongoing business ofpublic administration. In
this article, Professor Horowitz traces the origins, characteristics, and
consequences of organizational change decrees. He finds their roots in
an unusually fluid and indeterminate system ofproceduralforms and
legal rules, a system hospitable to the impact of changing ideas about
theperformance of bureaucracy and the role of courts. He explores the
problematic character of organizational change litigation, underscoring
the ways in which organizational behavior is fraught with a variety of
informal relationshps beyond the contemplation of the courts. In Pro-
fessor Horowitz'sjudgment, efforts to augment the capacity of courts to
cope more effectively with organizational change litigation may redound
to the disadvantage of thejudicialprocess by emphasizing the new man-
agerial role of the courts at the expense of their traditional moralfunc-
tion. He concludes by suggesting that capricious budgetary
ramifications, unintended consequences, and the impact of unconven-
tional enforcement practices on the courts themselves be included
among the elements of a full evaluation of organizational change
litigation.
A century and a half ago, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that in the
United States the "language of the law" is "a vulgar tongue." By that
he meant simply that American culture was so peculiarly suffused with
legalism that "the whole people" was accustomed to discoursing in le-
gal terms.1 It is not surprising that such a people should experience
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high rates of litigation, that its lawyers and judges should be conspicu-
ous and powerful figures, that the ambit of what is characterized as a
legal issue should be broad, or that the boundaries between the legal
system and the political and social systems should be uncertain, shift-
ing, and permeable. All of these are familiar, even commonplace, but
still cogent observations about our culture.
Less commonplace but equally important is the observation that
our governmental institutions are unusually pliable and adaptable.
2
We have a separation of powers but no clearcut division of labor. We
are accustomed to functional overlap and redundancy among institu-
tions, often the product of our willingness to turn institutions to new
purposes. The legalization of political discourse, coupled with the gen-
eral elasticity of institutional boundaries, has created a venerable tradi-
tion in the United States of turning to the courts when battles are lost in
other forums.
Yet, if the courts traditionally provided another opportunity for
disappointed claimants contesting governmental action, the nature of
that opportunity was circumscribed by some characteristic modes of
judicial operation. The claim had to be presented in the context-or at
least the clothing-of a lawsuit; the outcome, even if at variance with
the outcome in the legislature or the bureaucracy, was ordinarily cast in
terms of a decision merely permitting or forbidding certain conduct.
There was plenty of room for creativity, no doubt: statutes might be
reconstructed beyond the dreams of their draftsmen; constitutional pro-
visions might be enlarged to dimensions previously unknown.3 But,
until the 1960's, the courts had rarely, if ever, told states and federal
government agencies something other than that they legally could or
could not do what they had been doing. The courts had not, in short,
prescribed for them what they must do.4
Since the 1960's, however, federal and, to a lesser extent, state
courts have issued a relatively small but highly significant number of
"structural injunctions."' 5 The defendants have been such governmen-
tal bodies as school systems, prison officials, welfare administrations,
mental hospital officials, and public housing authorities. 6 Structural in-
junctions, or institutional reform decrees, are orders requiring that gov-
2. See S. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY 127 (1981).
3. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905).
4. Mandamus directed to administrators was reserved for purely ministerial acts.
5. The term belongs to Owen Fiss, INJUNCTIONS 415-82 (1972).
6. For a good recent survey, see S. Fluckiger, J. Heller, & D. Krause, The Changing Role of
the Judiciary in Public Management and Governance (unpublished paper prepared for the Na-
tional Academy of Public Administration, March 1983).
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ernmental bodies reorganize themselves so that their future behavior
will comport with standards announced in the underlying judicial deci-
sions. These decrees have a number of novel characteristics.
First, they are extensive as well as affirmative in their commands.
Their requirements run not to one or two acts but to a whole course of
conduct, typically to both general policy and details.7 The decrees re-
quire actions whose performance cannot be accomplished and mea-
sured rapidly, actions that may span years.
Second, the decrees are administrative in character. In varying
measures, they essentially supersede the authority of the defendant
body to manage its own business, subject to executive and legislative
accountability. In some cases, such decrees entail the formal displace-
ment of the officers of the agency and the substitution of a receiver or
some other court-appointed officer to act in their stead.8 But, whether
they involve displacement of officials or not, structural injunctions set
up a new source of authority and accountability for the managers of
public institutions. That new source is the courts.
Third, structural decrees are legislative in the double sense of en-
tailing fundamental alterations of policy direction and of frequently
requiring augmentation of financial resources. The basis of the under-
lying judicial decision is typically a wide-ranging policy determination
anchored in broad statutory or constitutional provisions and having
only a loose connection to the claims and interests of specific parties.9
The decree that purports to reform a public institution often injects the
courts into the public budgeting process. This can occur indirectly, as it
did when, following Wyatt v. Stickney,' 0 Alabama's spending on
mental institutions rose from $14 million in 1971 to $58 million in 1973,
one year after the decree was rendered." Judicial budgeting can also
occur directly, as it did when a federal court ordered the city of Boston
to fund a bail appeal project that had lost other sources of funding, in
7. See, e.g., Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 292-93 (1976); Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F.
Supp. 844, 861-64 (D.D.C. 1971); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785-86 (M.D. Ala. 1971),
supplemented, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (1971), 344 F. Supp. 373 (1972), 344 F. Supp. 387 (1972), a din
part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
8. See, e.g., Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 758-68 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (spe-
cial master), supplemented, 383 F. Supp. 769 (1974), afl'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975); NAACP v.
Brennan, 360 F. Supp. 1006, 1019 (D.D.C. 1973)("special master and/or hearing examiner"); Pe-
rez v. Boston Hous. Auth., 379 Mass. 703, 735-38, 400 N.E.2d 1231, 1247-49 (1980) (receiver).
9. See generally Chayes, The Role ofthe Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976).
10. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), supplemented, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (1971), 344 F. Supp.
373 (1972), 344 F. Supp. 387 (1972), a f'dinpartsub noma Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th
Cir. 1974).
11. Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1973, at 42, col. 1.
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order to facilitate the release of inmates incarcerated in an over-
crowded jail.12 The assumption of many institutional reform decrees
has been that the courts could draw upon additional resources. Broad
remedies could be implemented because it was assumed there would be
compliance with what were, in substance, judicially-ordered budgetary
priorities. Only in the wake of austerity in governmental budgets has it
been sensed that an "absence of resources places the court in the posi-
tion of having to design decrees directed solely and narrowly to the
issue before the court."13
Fourth, because the decrees call for alteration of an ongoing
course of conduct, for a new regime of organizational behavior, they
necessitate continuing judicial involvement in the implementation and
modification of the decree. The court becomes a participant in the af-
fairs of the defendant-organization, its clients, and its whole environ-
ment, often more than a court might wish. Monitoring of compliance
with the decree becomes essential, liaison with such adjunct personnel
as masters and receivers is common, periodic reporting to the court is
generally required, and amendment of the provisions of the decree
from time to time may be deemed desirable.
Fifth, despite their innovative character, these decrees have proved
remarkably resistant to appellate review. They do, of course, depend
heavily on facts typically found after extensive hearings, and they en-
tail the exercise of large doses of judicial discretion. On both counts,
they call into play canons of appellate abstemiousness about second-
guessing trial courts. The result is that major changes in the law and in
the relations among governmental bodies have been wrought mainly
by trial courts. There is something of an analogy to the situation of the
1930's, when enforcement of much New Deal legislation was brought
to a halt by injunctions issued by solitary, hostile district judges. And
there is the paradox that the remedial phase of the litigation, which is
recognized as crucially important, receives the least attention, in terms
of both procedural safeguards and appellate review.
If I have focused mainly on the characteristics of the decrees, that
is not because of any conviction that the underlying declaration of
rights is unimportant in such cases. On the contrary, I have spelled out
elsewhere the many ways (quite apart from the decree) in which such
social policy or institutional reform cases differ from the conventional
run of litigation. 14 Rather, I want to underscore here the difference in
12. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 518 F.2d 1241 (1st Cir. 1975).
13. Weinstein, The Effect ofAusterity on Institutional Litgation, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV, 145,
147 (1982).
14. See generally D. HOROWrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977).
1268 [Vol. 1983:1265
INSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
remedy, because the role of the courts in the supervision of public insti-
tutions is very largely the product of recent remedial innovation. The
decree that prescribes organizational change is only about fifteen years
old. The suddenness of the innovation calls for a searching evaluation
of the forces that brought on the innovation, what judicial supervision
of public institutions entails, and the consequences such supervision
may have, including consequences for the courts themselves.
I. THE ORIGINS OF A NEW JUDICIAL ROLE
It makes sense to think about two kinds of change in the courts
that have paved the way for judicial supervision of public organiza-
tions. One is institutional. Legal structures, rules, and doctrines must
have been available to be turned to new uses, and they must indeed
have been transformed if the identification of this as a new area of
judicial activity is accurate. The other change is ideological. There
have been important developments in what judges and lawyers believe,
and these developments affect the outcome of structural reform litiga-
tion. The two kinds of change interact. The structure of legal con-
straints and modes of proceeding have evolved in a way that is
congenial to the new conceptions, but the new conceptions could not
have been put into effect without the preexisting structure of rules and
traditions. An implication of this analysis is that no single develop-
ment produced organizational change decrees, and no alteration of a
rule or institution could, by itself, effect a reversal of course.
Although I shall treat these two kinds of change separately, the
adaptability of American legal institutions has largely meant that,
when beliefs changed, legal inventiveness was more than adequate to
turn available institutions in a new direction. In a more hidebound,
formalistic system, it is quite possible that the requisite changes would
not have taken place.15 Ours is simply an unusually fluid and indeter-
minate system of procedural forms and legal rules, hospitable to ac-
commodating an array of purposes.
A. he Institutional History of Judicial Intervention.
This exposition is intentionally sketchy and impressionistic in two
senses. First, the enumeration of institutional changes makes no pre-
tense to completeness. An exhaustive history of such changes in a
change-prone system like ours would be an exhausting (although re-
warding) task, but I have not embarked on it. Second, I intend to touch
15. Indeed, to put the point concretely, English lawyers continue to be surprised by the extent
to which the American legal system is susceptible to change.
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on changes at varying levels, subsuming them under the deliberately
amorphous rubric of "institutional change." Consequently, I shall
highlight broad traditions, specific judicial decisions, specific rules of
procedure, general statutory trends, and specific practices in the con-
duct of litigation. This eclecticism is warranted by the contribution
made by a variety of legal institutions to the contemporary judicial role
in supervising public organizations. If this survey proves kaleidoscopic
on that account, it may well do fuller justice to the subject than one that
is more carefully focused and symmetrical.
1. The American Equity Tradition. I turn first to something so
important and obvious in our legal history, so much a part of the intel-
lectual equipment of American lawyers, that it is in danger of being
overlooked: the equity tradition. The contours of the equity jurisdic-
tion that emerged in England, as Gary McDowell has chronicled it in a
recent volume,' 6 were the subject of great dispute. The controversy be-
tween Sir Edward Coke and Sir Francis Bacon is, of course, well
known. Among other things, the dispute involved (1) the extent to
which equity jurisdiction and law jurisdiction were to be fused or sepa-
rate, (2) the extent to which equity was to "follow the law" or to pro-
vide an independent and even competing set of principles of redress,
and (3) the extent to which equity was to be bounded by precedent.
This controversy was carried over into the United States, where it was
joined with the notion of a higher, natural law, a notion ultimately re-
jected in England.' 7 As in England, there was a recurrent fear of un-
bridled judicial power, and the equity power was one component of
this apprehension. In spite of this fear, equity ultimately found a
prominent place in American jurisprudence, especially in the aid of
those constitutional rights that had a natural law foundation.
The three contentious issues of English equity took a long time to
resolve in the United States. With the Field Code of 1848 in New York
and its successors in other states, and with the 1938 Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, law and equity were merged, first in many state court
systems and then in the federal courts. Equity, at first an exceptional
remedy, came to be regarded, not as following the law, but as re-
dressing its deficiencies. Although equity judges were, in principle, to
be bound by prior cases, the spirit of the English Chancellor, able to
devise a new remedy ample enough to vindicate an identifiable right,
came to pervade the American version. In short, the equity tradition
16. G. McDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1982).




proved unusually congenial to remedial adaptation. Particularly when
constitutional fights seemed to call out for enforcement through the
medium of a wide-ranging injunction, equity was available, replete
with appropriate maxims about remedies as broad as required to undo
the violation.
The use of the sweeping injunction reached its apogee in the
1930's, when federal district judges enjoined the enforcement of New
Deal legislation, bringing on the requirement of three-judge district
courts for such cases in 1937.18 The equitable tradition survived those
events, and what we have inherited is an equity that is expansive, open
and available for new problems, and not closely chained to law and
legal remedies. In institutional reform cases, the operational meaning
of the American equity tradition is to legitimize detailed affirmative
decrees having a long life, in the name of insuring that equity does not
suffer a wrong without a remedy.
2. The Managerial Premise of the Federal Rules. The adoption
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 did more than merely
merge law and equity. The Rules vindicated a particular version of
judicial administration that sharply modified the preexisting adversary
control over all aspects of litigation. Consistent with the views of re-
formers such as Dean Charles E. Clark and Judges John J. Parker and
Arthur T. Vanderbilt, who were intent on establishing "judge-centered
control of the litigation process,"1 9 the Federal Rules established on a
secure footing the power of the judge as the manager of the case. The
most notable examples of this activist view of judicial participation
were the pre-trial conference and the pre-trial order introduced by
Rule 16, but it is also implicit in the need for judges to umpire discov-
ery disputes.20 The trial judge, in Parker's view, influential on this is-
sue, was to "crack down on [lawyers] and make them get down to
business." 21 Intolerant of procedural "fol-de-rol" that impeded the
sharp and efficient quest for justice, Parker and his pioneer colleagues
in the reform of judicial administration argued that judges should as-
sume an active and autonomous role in shaping the contours of litiga-
tion and moving it along expeditiously, sweeping aside obstacles to
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1970), repealed by Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 2, 90
Stat. 1119.
19. The phrase belongs to my colleague, Peter G. Fish, Guarding the Judicial Ramparts: John
J. Parker and the Administration of Federal Justice, 3 JusT. SYs. J. 105, 108 (1977). I am indebted
to Professor Fish for his suggestions regarding the indirect impact of the Rules on institutional
reform litigation.
20. See Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374, 378-79 (1982).
21. Fish, supra note 19, at 108.
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substantive justice. Not surprisingly, the same John Parker who sought
to sweep aside procedural obstacles to substantive justice was a protag-
onist of an expansive view of the equity powers of the federal courts-a
view that makes clearer the connection between the earlier conception
of the managerial role of the judge and the later conception of that role.
It is, to be sure, not a short step from manager of the case to man-
ager of the defendant-organization. Nevertheless, when other pieces
fell into place, the activist posture fostered by the Federal Rules and by
their proponents was hospitable to judges' stepping in, taking bulls by
horns, and demanding that parties meet the standards they lay down.
The Rules were oriented toward getting results. To this end, the Rules
provided a number of procedural devices to be utilized flexibly by
judges willing to reach into the procedural tool kit for an instrument
appropriate to a task, however difficult or unconventional it might
appear.
3. Adaptable Devices. The Case of Rule 53. For our purposes,
the most significant procedural device is the master made available by
Rule 53. Now it is very plain to anyone who reads Rule 53 that it
contemplates the appointment of a master principally for fact-finding
purposes in exceptional cases. In this respect, the rule merely codifies
and makes more precise an antecedent common law practice in the
United States. Even then, however, the practice was neither uniformly
nor enthusiastically adopted. Eighteen years before the Rules, the
Supreme Court had upheld the appointment by then-District Judge
Augustus N. Hand of an "auditor" to simplify and clarify issues and
make tentative findings of fact in a somewhat complicated contract
case.22 An opinion by Justice Brandeis for a divided Court established
that, consistent with the constitutional right to a jury trial, and subject
to legislation, trial courts have "inherent power to provide themselves
with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their du-
ties."'23 The examples cited in the opinion made it abundantly clear
that all the duties referred to involved pre-trial fact-finding and simpli-
fication of the issues. Against that background, Rule 53 was framed.
Rule 53 was drawn carefully to limit the occasions justifying the
appointment of a master. The rule contemplates that masters are to
function in proceedings prior to judgment, an assumption that is in evi-
dence in all the subsections, those that deal with the compensation and
powers of the master, the court's order of reference, the proceedings to
be conducted, and the report to be rendered. Even then, Rule 53(b)
22. In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920).
23. Id at 312.
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provides that "reference to a master shall be the exception and not the
rule," to be ordered in a jury case "only when the issues are compli-
cated" and in a non-jury case (except where accounting is involved)
"only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it."
For several decades, federal appellate courts exercised great care
in limiting both the occasions for the employment of masters and the
functions they could perform. When a district judge, faced with a con-
gested docket, referred two protracted antitrust cases to a master to take
evidence and render a report to the court, the Supreme Court rebuked
him.24 Affirming an order of mandamus against the judge, the Court
held that complexity, anticipated trial time, and congestion were not
enough to justify the reference. Conceivably, the opinion hinted,25 a
master might be utilized in the accounting required to assess damages if
liability were established, but only if it would intrude unduly on the
judge's time for him to do the job.
The cautious view of the Supreme Court, colored by its reluctance
to permit the delegation of judicial duties, was very much in line with
the accepted understanding of Rule 53 before the 1970's. Courts saw
threats to core values in what would otherwise have been insignificant
decisions to refer private law cases to masters. Sitting en banc, the
Third Circuit had, for example, mandamused then-District Judge
Harry Kalodner, who, in a stockholder's suit, had appointed a master
to investigate the defendant-corporation, which he suspected of issuing
a misleading financial statement.2 6 Masters, explained the court of ap-
peals, "are only for the purpose of assisting the court to get at the facts
and arrive at a correct result in a complicated piece of litigation pend-
ing before the court. The master operates as an arm of the court.
Surely he has no wider scope of authority than the court itself."27 The
willingness of the court to issue mandamus was informed by its appre-
hension that masters are susceptible to employment in the nonjudicial
function of investigation. This was a function the court was eager to
discourage, for the opinion goes so far as to lay down that an order of
reference may be no broader than the allegations and proofs of the
parties.28 In short, the master is an adjunct of the adversary system and
nothing more.
24. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
25. Id at 259.
26. Webster Eisenlohr, Inc. v. Kalodner, 145 F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1944) (3-2), cert. denied, 325
U.S. 867 (1945).
27. 145 F.2d at 319.
28. Id at 319-20.
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This, as I say, was the prevailing view for several decades. In
1966, the Eighth Circuit, in a decision with quite the same flavor as the
earlier decision of the Third, proceeded to check a district judge who
was about to use a master in a nonadversary way.29 After a determina-
tion of liability in a treble-damage antitrust case, the court had asked a
master to decide how much profit the plaintiff had lost. The order of
reference, however, provided that the master could go beyond the evi-
dence already adduced on lost profit and directed the defendants to
produce an array of financial material for examination by the master,
an accountant. Making clear its distaste for inquisitorial proceedings,
even after liability has been determined, the court of appeals held such
an order of reference, authorizing "prospecting for further evidential
possibilities," a "speculative" exploration outside the bounds of Rule
53.30
No significant delegation of judicial duties, no routine use of mas-
ters, no transformation of procedure from adversary to inquisitorial or
from passive to active, and no use of masters after judgment: these
were the ground rules for Rule 53 until fairly recently. And then some-
thing snapped-or, more accurately, it began to fray until it snapped.
At first, masters were appointed to formulate school desegregation
plans when plans submitted by the parties were unacceptable to the
court.31 This occurred, essentially, after liability had been determined
but before a remedy had been settled upon. By the mid-1970's, how-
ever, another step was taken. Masters were appointed to oversee the
implementation of decrees already rendered.32 As we shall see, district
judges and commentators have often endorsed the utility of the master
for this purpose in sweeping terms, but reviewing courts have not al-
ways been equally enthusiastic.
A few examples will clarify the nature of their reservations. Chi-
cago Housing Authority v. Austin 33 involved an inquiry by a district
court into a long delay in the implementation of its order that the sup-
ply of dwelling units be increased in the city of Chicago. The trial court
29. Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Oliver, 364 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1966).
30. Id at 34.
31. See Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 764 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), supple-
mented, 383 F. Supp. 769 (1974), a1 7'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975); Swarm v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 1291, 1312 (W.D.N.C. 1969), 311 F. Supp. 265 (1970), vacated on
other grounds, 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970), on remand, 318 F. Supp. 786 (W.D.N.C. 1970), ajJ'd,
402 U.S. 1 (1971).
32. See generally Kirp & Babcock, Judge and Company Court-Appointed Masters, School
Desegregation, and Institutional Reforn, 32 ALA. L. REv. 313 (1981); Nathan, The Use o/Masters
in Institutional Refarm Litigation, 10 U. TOL. L. REv. 419 (1979).
33. 511 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1975).
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appointed a master to determine the cause of the delay and to examine
all possibilities in the quest for expeditious implementation. Citing the
Supreme Court's cautious construction of Rule 53, defendants sought
mandamus against the trial judge. The gist of their argument was that
reference of this matter to a master constituted abdication of the judi-
cial function in favor of a delegate. Holding that the master's findings
would not bind the judge, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
declined to issue the writ. A dissenting judge, however, suggested that
the master's findings might provide the basis for a contempt order,
which was what the trial judge seemed to have in mind. But the dissent
did not attack the judge's order to the master to engage in an explora-
tion of possibilities, a function more central to judicial supervision of
public institutions than is fact-finding for a possible contempt citation.
The Chicago Housing Authority case provides something of a
bridge to the later cases, in which masters have been used for much
more than fact-finding or even enumerating and evaluating implemen-
tation possibilities. In a Texas prison case, for example, the Fifth Cir-
cuit in 1982 approved the appointment of a master and six monitors
after the decree.34 The court of appeals was nevertheless troubled by
that portion of the order of reference that permitted the master to sub-
mit reports to the district court based on his own on-site observations
rather than on findings generated by a hearing. This the court found to
be a violation of due process.3 5 But, by now, so well established was
the power to appoint masters after the decree was entered that the court
consigned its approval on that point to footnote 234.36 There is, how-
ever, no glimmer of recognition in the opinion that the appointment of
masters at the implementation stage is likely, in the nature of the enter-
prise, to involve precisely the sort of ex parte reports of which the court
disapproved.
By the 1980's, then, the use of masters at the implementation stage
is accepted, but there remains some apprehension about delegation of
judicial functions and abandonment of adversary modes of proceeding.
And so, even as the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
appointment of a master to formulate a school desegregation plan-
indeed, none of the parties even challenged the appointment-it disap-
proved the delegation to the master of responsibility for evaluating "the
constitutional sufficiency" of alternative plans.37 That, held the court,
34. Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.), modfed on reh'g, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1438 (1983).
35. 679 F.2d at 1163.
36. Id at 1160 n.234.
37. Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 737, 741 (6th Cir. 1979).
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is a legal matter, and the judge is not entitled to "out-of-court advice
on legal issues."' 38 Here was a confluence of delegation and nonadver-
sariness that provoked a reaction on appeal.
The recent Rule 53 cases indicate that many of the concerns that
gave rise to judicial caution in approving employment of masters sur-
vive, even though that caution has been abandoned. Underlying these
developments is a growing recognition that institutional reform litiga-
tion has requirements different from those of earlier, more conven-
tional, if protracted, litigation, requirements that justify extraordinary
procedural flexibility.39 What I shall suggest later is that this much
procedural flexibility may not really be compatible with the enduring
sources of the earlier caution. For now, it is enough to note that the
interpretation of Rule 53 changed, and changed rapidly, as new needs
began to be felt. The shift in Rule 53 doctrine is powerful testimony to
the pliability of our legal institutions.
4. Fee Shiting. If plaintiffs in institutional reform cases were
obliged to pay their own legal fees, there would, of course, be many
fewer such cases. Institutional reform litigation largely followed the
establishment of public interest law firms in the 1960's. These were
funded by a variety of grantors: foundations, charitable and educa-
tional organizations, private contributors, and government. Causality
was not unidirectional, however. The public interest bar argued for
changes in doctrine, but the creation of that bar was itself the product
of some of those changes. A liberal view of standing and class actions,
for example, made litigation efforts plausible that would not have been
regarded as worthwhile earlier. Public interest firms grew as doctrine
shifted. When prison management and mental hospital management
were no longer held to be outside the purview of judicial review, prison
law and mental health law units were established to conduct further
litigation. So the relationship between litigation organizations and
emerging doctrine was reciprocal. Nevertheless, public interest law
firms and the institutional reforn litigation they conducted were both
subject to the vicissitudes of charitable funding.
In the 1970's, this dependence on declining sources of external
funding underwent some change. The litigation itself began to gener-
ate funding. In Aoleska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,40
decided in 1975, the Supreme Court held that, absent statutory authori-
38. Id at 748.
39. Put see Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 54 (1981)(White, J.,
dissenting).
40. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
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zation, the federal courts are not permitted to award attorneys' fees to
the winning party. Alveska was bound to generate attempts in Con-
gress to write fee provisions into legislation. The attempts met with a
large measure of success. Not only has there been a proliferation of
statutes allowing awards of attorneys' fees, to be paid by defendants to
plaintiffs,41 but some have been construed to permit awards even if the
plaintiff's counsel had agreed to serve without fee.42 In the few years
before Alyeska, Congress had increasingly taken to writing fee provi-
sions into legislation, and a flood of such provisions followed the deci-
sion. In the two years following Aleska, thirty-seven new provisions
were enacted by Congress authorizing the award of attorneys' fees.
That is about as many as had been enacted in the entire pre-1960 pe-
riod and not later repealed. From 1978 through 1980, Congress added
yet another forty-four fee-shifting provisions. The increase is so dra-
matic that it is best depicted graphically, as in Figure 1.
Figure 1 shows thatAlyeska was not alone in the generation of fee-
shifting provisions, but it certainly catalyzed the movement. There are
now about 180 federal provisions authorizing fee awards. In the states,
the practice is highly variable, but there is a trend toward increased
shifting of fees in the direction of plaintiffs. One state shifts fees across
the board, others in particular classes of cases, and some only in cases
brought under particular statutes of limited applicability.43 There
have, then, been piecemeal but powerful assaults on the American rule
that generally requires each party to bear its own legal fees.
To be sure, the vast majority of the new statutes operate in fields
with no bearing on judicial supervision of administration. But some of
the new provisions are central to this matter. The Civil Rights Attor-
ney's Fees Awards Act of 197644 is the most important. A response to
Ayeska, it allows a fee award to the prevailing party in a wide variety
of enforcement actions. Substantial fees have already been awarded
41. Until Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274 (1983), an argument could be made for
a fee award to even a losing plaintiff under several environmental statutes authorizing a fee award
whenever "appropriate." See Note,Awards ofAtorneys'Fees to Unsuccessful Environmental Liti-
gants, 96 HARv. L. REv. 677 (1983). The Court in Ruckelshaus rejected this argument, however.
103 S. Ct. at 3281.
42. See, e.g., Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974).
43. See Rowe, Attorney Fee Arrangements and Dispute Resolution, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1984 (forthcoming); Zemans, Legal Structures and the Implementation of Public
Policy: The Case of the American Rule, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984 (forthcoming). I
am indebted to Professor Rowe for helpful comments on fee shifting and on other matters dealt
with in Part I of this article.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V 1981).
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under these provisions. In the Texas prison case, discussed above,45 the
district court made a fee award of $1,662,683.46 In the Willowbrook
case in New York, involving the administration of a center for retarded
children and adults, a fee of $613,992 was awarded to plaintiffs' coun-
sel.47 And in the ongoing Chicago housing case, an interim award of
$375,375 has been affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.48 Where one of the defendants is a state agency, attempts by
state legislatures to avoid payment of fees-by refusing to appropriate
funds, for example-have been rebuffed.
49
In the 1970's and 1980's, fee shifting has provided and will con-
tinue to provide an important prop for institutional reform litigation.
The dependence of public interest law firms and legal services agencies
on private contributions, foundation grants, and public funding ren-
dered institutional reform litigation vulnerable to the vagaries of phil-
anthropic and political impulses. As those funding sources wane, fee-
shifting statutes may have the opposite effect of perpetuating this cate-
gory of litigation. The existence of statutory authorization for fee
awards in some areas but not others constitutes an incentive to bring
suit in these areas, because a few generous awards can subsidize suits
not generating fees. That this expectation is not fanciful is suggested by
two general features of institutional reform litigation. The first is the
absence or at best muted presence of live plaintiffs making litigation
decisions in such cases. For the most part, this is lawyer-initiated and
lawyer-controled litigation.50 The second is that some courts have al-
lowed the recovery of a market value fee, rather than a fee geared to
the actual income of relatively low-paid public interest lawyers.5' This
creates the possibility of a surplus available for use as overhead or
subsidy.
5. Doctrinal Change. Much has been made of the general loos-
ening of doctrines of standing, ripeness, mootness, political questions,
and justiciability in the last two decades and of the impact this develop-
45. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
46. Ruiz v. Estelle, 553 F. Supp. 567, 597-98 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
47. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1154 (2d Cir.
1983).
48. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 690 F.2d 601, 614 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 2438 (1983).
49. See Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1982); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 622 F.2d
804 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981); Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir.
1980). See generally Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
50. Cf. Chayes, The Role ofthe Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1291
(1976).
51. E.g., Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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ment has had on social policy and institutional reform litigation.5 2
Like many of the other developments I have discussed, most of these
doctrinal changes are both effect and cause of the new litigation. I do
not intend to rehearse them here. Two Supreme Court decisions were,
however, more the cause than the effect of judicial willingness to take
on administrative responsibilities with respect to public agencies. One
of them, of course, is Brown v. Board of Education, 5which, despite the
initial diffidence of the Court, ultimately thrust federal courts into an
affirmative role in the management of school systems.5 4 The other was
Baker v. Carr,55 the first of the modem reapportionment cases.
Had it not been for Baker v. Carr, school desegregation might
have been regarded as a very special case. Even in Plessy v. Ferguson,56
the Supreme Court had acknowledged that segregation presented a le-
gal question. In the case of reapportionment, that was the thing in is-
sue, for the Court had previously held that such suits did not raise
justiciable questions.5 7 Once Baker declared them to be justiciable, the
earth quaked beneath the panoply of doctrines that had kept the courts
away from the internal affairs of other governmental bodies, legislative
and administrative. After Baker reformulated the political question
doctrine, it was a short step to the reformulation of comparable thresh-
old doctrines. With the barriers lowered, the courts moved toward
making judicial business more nearly coterminous with the business of
government, both state and federal. Even more important, with the
clearing of the "political thicket ' 58 that took place in legislative reap-
portionment, state administrative terrain began to look like mere un-
derbrush. If courts could refashion state and federal legislatures-not
to mention electoral rules under the Voting Rights Act 5 9 and patronage
systems under the first amendment 60-why, then, could they not re-
fashion schools, prisons, welfare administrations, mental hospitals,
housing authorities, and all the rest? What was unthinkable before be-
52. See, e.g., D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 10 (1977). For a recent doc-
trinal survey, see Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword Public Law Litigation and
the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982).
53. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
54. Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
55. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
56. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
57. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
58. Id at 556 (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion announcing judgment of Court),
59. See, e.g., Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex.), af'dsub nom. Archer v. Smith,
409 U.S. 808 (1972), modiftedsub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
60. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); McFeeley,




came litigable. Within a few years, the courts began to move into these
areas, and by 1981-to cite one suggestive figure-litigation over
prison conditions was pending in three quarters of the states.61 In ac-
counting for the broad decree that aims to restructure public institu-
tions, Baker v. Carr deserves equal billing with Brown v. Board of
Education.
These developments, which occurred in the short span of perhaps
a decade and a half, had the effect of spreading judge-made law out,
moving it from the byways onto the highways. The lawsuit became
more and more interchangeable with options in other forums. And
while this was happening, courts were also facilitating resort to them
for redress in other ways. Calendars are still congested, but many
courts have been especially accommodating to litigants seeking injunc-
tions. Expedited hearing is available on motions for injunctive relief,
and often expedited appeals are available as well. 62 So even the con-
straint of the queue has been mitigated by procedural hospitability to
the injunction. Brown created a magnetic field around the courts;
Baker made intrusion plausible that had earlier been summarily re-
jected; and court rules reduced at least some of the characteristic disin-
centives to litigation.
6. The Interplay of Institutions. The courts have not been re-
sponsible singlehandedly for all of the change attributed to them. It is a
mistaken view of the American system that sees each branch as a sepa-
rate actor, awaiting its proper turn. What each does affects the agenda
of the others. In the case of institutional reform and social policy litiga-
tion, the action and inaction of Congress and the bureaucracy have
been important accelerators of judicial intervention.
To take inaction first, it is not surprising that demands for change
in the area of segregation should have been made upon the federal gov-
ernment. It hardly needs saying that state governments practicing seg-
regation were closed to those demands, and so the claims had to be
pressed at the national level. But it was not foreordained that they
61. Figures vary somewhat, depending on the source consulted. From 1978 to 1983, virtually
every source lists between 30 and 42 states with prisons or prison systems in litigation or under
court order. See American Civil Liberties Union Foundation National Prison Project, Status Re-
port-The Courts and Prisons (Jan. 28, 1983); Contact, Inc., Corrections Compendium, March
1982, at 7; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CONDITIONS AND COSTS OF CONFINEMENT 3, 33,
36-37 (1980) (volume 3 of the AMERICAN PRISONS AND JAILS series); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1981 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 150
(1982).
62. See, e.g., FED. R. App. P. 8; FED. R. Civ. P. 65; D.C. CIR. R. 6(i), 7(c)(3); 5TH CIR. R.
27(2)(11), 34(5); 9TH CIR. R. 3(g); D.D.C. R. 1(12); S.D.N.Y. R. FOR Div. OF Bus. 9.
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should be made in the judicial branch. The claims were made in court
in part because of a procedural rule of the United States Senate. The
rule that allows unlimited debate foreclosed legislation that might have
rendered Brown superfluous.63 The civil rights filibuster was a parent
of the desegregation cases.
It has long been suggested that the willingness of courts to assume
broad responsibilities that entail judicial intervention into the affairs of
public bodies has discouraged legislators from taking the heat. Proba-
bly there is some truth in the suggestion. But the record is a mixed one.
Had the courts not broken the ice on segregation, the civil rights legis-
lation of the 1960's would have been more problematical. There is no
straight cause and effect operating here, so much as there is interaction
and circularity.
On a couple of points of legislative action, however, we may feel
fairly confident of a causal impact on the courts, rather than the other
way around. Over the past two or three decades, Congress has been
proliferating rights. No doubt, this is partly because the courts have
aroused a new spirit of rights consciousness. However that may be, it is
undeniable that the constellation of statutory entitlements is much
more dense than it was before. Many of the new rights are of the sort
that impinge on the management of public institutions."4 There has,
moreover, been a clearly discernible trend toward glib generality in the
declaration of these rights. For this tendency, there are many reasons
in the legislative process. The clash of interest groups, the greater ease
of sensing the existence of problems than of framing solutions, the wish
to retain flexibility, the desire to please as wide a constituency as possi-
ble, the benefits of calculated ambiguity, or the serendipity of unin-
tended ambiguity-all of these have produced a growing number of
statutes embodying vague standards or none at all.65 If their meaning
or their reach is unclear, someone will have to interpret them. In the
first instance, that someone will often be the administrative agency
charged with implementing the law. Sometimes the agency has taken a
bold view of its authority, which has then been ratified by the courts,
and sometimes the agency has been found to be too timid in fulfilling
63. S.R. XIX.
64. A well-known example of the new rights is the "right to appropriate treatment" for the
mentally retarded, a right declared in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See Pennhurst State School v. Hald-
erman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). Another example is the nondiscrimination provision of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1981). See New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979).
65. For a splendid example, see Schuck, The Graying of CivilgRhts Law: The.Age Discrimi-
nation Act of 1975, 89 YALE L.J. 27 (1979).
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its mandate. Whether the relationship between agency and court is
friendly or hostile, the court has the last word.66
In this way, what legislators and administrators have not done,
what they have done, and what they have only half done have all pro-
vided the raw material for judicial action. It is by no means only the
Constitution that has moved the courts into public management.
B. The Intellectual History of Judicial Intervention.
The shaping of a set of procedural rules congenial to an activist,
managerial posture on the part of judges, the rapid shifts in doctrine in
the course of the 1960's and 1970's, the dramatically new use of masters
emerging in the 1970's, the spate of fee-shifting statutes enacted in the
same decade, the legislative declaration of new rights: all testify to the
importance of changing ideas behind changing institutions. The new
ideas relate to the appropriate role of the courts in meeting social
problems, but they also entail a general view of the character of those
problems. Barely articulated, the new ideas have nonetheless propelled
institutional reform litigation forward in a powerful way.
Writing in 1980 of "The Activist Judicial Mind," Ralph Winter
attributed much judicial intervention to three "reformist attitudes": (1)
"hostility to a pluralist, party dominated, political process"; (2) a belief
in the need for "'rationality' in public policy"; and (3) "skepticism
about the morality of capitalism. ' 67 I am less sure than Winter about
the last point, but I feel quite confident about the first two (though I
shall reformulate them somewhat) and about their relation to each
other.
During the 1960's, a change came over much of the federal judici-
ary. The restlessness of that important decade affected judges, as it af-
fected elites throughout the society. What it did, on the whole, was to
broaden the sense of their mission and to infuse their work with a skep-
ticism that had been notably absent before. The broadening and the
skepticism were both of a special sort. Judges began to articulate their
function in terms of correcting mistakes made elsewhere. Judge J.
Skelly Wright wrote a book review suggesting that the judicial role in
administrative agency litigation should be conceived as a "fight to limit
discretion" on the part of government bodies, in the name of "rational
and permissible rule[s] of decision. ' 68 Although such views were not
66. See the fine article by Jeremy Rabkin, The Judiciary in the Administrative State, 71 PUB.
INTEREsT 62 (1983).
67. R. Winter, The Activist Judicial Mind 5 (unpublished paper presented at the American
Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., Dec. 10, 1980).
68. Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice (Book Review), 81 YALE L.J. 575, 581, 594 (1972).
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uniformly held on the federal bench, they were also not idiosyncratic to
Judge Wright. They were quickly reflected in judicial doctrines of, for
example, "strict judicial scrutiny of administrative action, '69 doctrines
explicitly predicated on the fact that "the character of administrative
litigation is changing. ' 70 The opinion of the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in Calvert Cifs Coordinating Committee v. United States Atomic
Energy Commission7' opens with a splendid oration on the new role:
These cases are only the beginning of what promises to become
a flood of new litigation-litigation seeking judicial assistance in pro-
tecting our natural environment. Several recently enacted statutes
attest to the commitment of the Government to control, at long last,
the destructive engine of material "progress." But it remains to be
seen whether the promise of this legislation will become a reality.
Therein lies the judicial role. In these cases, we must for the first
time interpret the broadest and perhaps most important of the recent
statutes: the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).
We must assess claims that one of the agencies charged with its ad-
ministration has failed to live up to the congressional mandate. Our
duty, in short, is to see that important legislative purposes, heralded
in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hall-
ways of the federal bureaucracy.
72
Judge Wright was the author of this ringing prose, but he wrote for a
unanimous court.
Missing from this statement of the "judicial role" is any need to
decide a case, and indeed the broader conception relegates this part of
the judicial function to the background. But this is not all that is note-
worthy about the statement. It is suffused with distrust of bureaucracy.
Whereas, for a quarter of a century, the judicial review provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act73 had largely shielded the merits of
administrative agency determinations from review, by the early 1970's
there was a discernible trend toward more active, probing scrutiny of
the decisions of government bodies.74 The exception to judicial review
for "matters committed to agency discretion 75 began to be construed
narrowly.76 The vaunted virtues of the administrative state, built up in
the 1930's and 1940's, when great confidence was reposed in govern-
ment, became vices during the 1960's and 1970's. "Discretion" was
69. Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
70. Id at 597.
71. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
72. Id at 1111 (footnotes omitted).
73. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
74. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Conservation
Council v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973).
75. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982).
76. See, eg., Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc).
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often equated with arbitrariness. "Expertise" was tantamount to nar-
rowmindedness. "Flexibility" seemed to connote political compromise.
Judges had little taste for compromise, especially compromise with
"special interests," sensing it to be at odds with principle, which they
much preferred. Experts were in growing disrepute during this period.
And, as Ralph Winter says, rationality, certainly not discretion, was a
reigning principle. Now judges, rather than administrators, became the
expediters in the solution of major policy problems.
77
This did not all happen at once. The courts were much affected by
the odd mix of meliorism and distrust that characterized the 1960's:
things are wrong but not so wrong that they cannot be fixed by equal
doses of reason and disinterestedness; with both of these, courts are
presumed to be well endowed. To some extent, the courts also appear
to have been affected by what has been labeled the "post-materialism"
of the post-war period. Post-materialism is characterized by an in-
creasing concern with quality-of-life, rather than economic, issues, an
increasing skepticism of established political institutions (including
democratic ones), and growing participation in "elite-challenging, is-
sue-oriented" groups and movements. 78 This phenomenon is associ-
ated with high-income, high-education populations; it is very much a
function of the elite culture of which federal judges might be presumed
to partake.
At the same time, it is important to note that the federal judiciary
is far more interconnected and probably more homogeneous than it
once was. This nationalization of the bench is, in some respects, the
product of the movement toward efficient judicial administration, in-
cluding establishment of the Federal Judicial Center and attendance at
seminars and conferences that put judges in contact with each other. It
is also the result of the accelerated nationalization of elite legal educa-
tion in the post-war period. In addition, there is far more federal law
demanding some uniformity of enforcement on the part of lower fed-
eral judges. Where federal district courts were once as insular or nearly
as insular as their districts, today they are plainly part of a national
cadre, doing national work and responding to currents of thought
across districts, circuits, and regions of the country.
77. See Horowitz, The Courts as Guardians of the Public Interest, 37 PUB. AD. REV. 148
(1977).
78. R. INGLEHART, THE SILENT REVOLUTION: CHANGING VALUES AND POLITICAL STYLES
AMONG WESTERN PUBLICS 3-18 (1977); see also Inglehart, Values, Objective Needs and Subjective
Satisfaction ,4mong Western Publics, 9 COMP. POL. STUD. 429 (1977). In the second half of the
1960's, trust in government, as measured by survey data, plummeted. Miller, PoliticalIssues and
Trust in Government, 1964-1970, 68 AM. POL. Sm. REV. 951 (1974).
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The result of all of these forces is a fairly coherent view of institu-
tional reform litigation that has emerged in the work of judges over the
years. It is a view that is radically different from the conventional view
of judicial work. I am not suggesting that this view is entertained by
every federal judge-and I shall derive it from the works of just a few.
Just as institutional reform litigation comprises a small but highly sig-
nificant minority of cases on the federal docket, so judges who have
engaged in attempts to supervise organizational change comprise only
an important minority of all federal judges. Nevertheless, it is worth-
while to attempt to articulate the components of the view that has al-
ready gained considerable acceptance in the space of just a few years.
The emerging view embraces a theory of (1) the causes of institu-
tional reform litigation, (2) judicial responsibility in the context of that
litigation, (3) the special difficulties presented by the litigation, and (4)
the appropriate way to meet these difficulties. I shall describe each in
order.
1. The sources of institutional reform cases reside in the failures
of other branches of government. Government officials "succumb to
political pressures to shirk their constitutional responsibilities. ' 79 If
government agencies acted in "good faith" and without "intransi-
gence," they would remedy their own problems. 80 When they do not
do their duty, the courts have "no alternative but to take a more active
role in formulating appropriate relief."8' If the courts were to fail to
meet their responsibilities in these fields, that would be to sanction an
intolerable situation, namely, "rights without remedies. '8 2 It is incon-
ceivable that such a disparity be entertained as a possibility.
2. Underlying this appraisal is an expansive conception of judi-
cial responsibility. The conception takes two fairly recent and signifi-
cant jumps. The first is that it must fall to the courts to make good the
defaults of other decisionmakers: an abdication in one branch impels a
correlative performance in another, and this even across federal-state
lines. Here is a new, affirmative conception of checks and balances.
The other jump is the only half-spoken notion of unlimited remedies:
whatever it takes, a wrong will be righted by a court. Since this new
conception, inhospitable to any remedial shortfall, goes hand in hand
79. Johnson, The Role of the Federal Courts in Institutional Litigation, 32 ALA. L. REV. 271,
273, 279 (1981); see also Coffin, The Frontier ofRemedies: A Call/or Exploration, 67 CALIF. L.
Rnv. 983, 985 (1979).
80. Coffin, supra note 79, at 993, 994.
81. Johnson, supra note 79, at 274.
82. Id; see Coffin, supra note 79, at 994.
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with the declaration of new rights-rights to treatment, to humane con-
ditions, to mainstreaming, to rehabilitation, to quality education, etc.-
the remedial commitment of the courts becomes openended.
Not surprisingly, this view of the matter is not accompanied by a
statement of the inescapable necessity of deciding a case properly
before the court, for by now it is recognized that a sharp controversy
over a precise grievance is not really what produces the litigation.
Rather, the judicial function is recast more broadly. One formulation,
whatever its prescriptive utility, aptly describes much of what has tran-
spired: the courts sit "to give meaning to constitutional values in the
operation of large-scale organizations. '8 3 The courts are, then,
squarely in the business of reforming bureaucracies.
3. Having so conceived the judicial function, the courts and the
commentators are afflicted with a certain ambivalence. On the one
hand, they are inclined to dismiss challenges to the new role by assimi-
lating it to customary judicial tasks: trust administration, bankruptcy
administration, railroad reorganization. 84 Only myopia, in this view,
could lead to the assertion that there is anything new under the judicial
sun. On the other hand, the extraordinary remedies invoked frequently
lead to an acknowledgment of novelty:
[P]ublic law litigation often places a trial judge in a position where
his role is necessarily somewhat different from that performed in
more traditional cases. This is especially true in the remedial phase
of a school desegregation or institutional reform case. School and
institutional financing and administration are subjects with which
few judges have more than a passing familiarity. Yet, when litiga-
tion exposes constitutional violations in public institutions a court of
equity must take steps to eliminate them.
85
The reason for the acknowledgment is clear. Unconventional remedial
devices are utilized, and unconventional behavior is exhibited by
judges and their delegates in such cases. The propriety of both will
have to be adjudicated. Typically, the decision is permissive, and it
turns on the fact that "[t]his was not a standard lawsuit. It was a mas-
sive, long-continuing litigation which has approximated the type in-
volving institutional reform.
'8 6
4. In a few short years, it has become quite common to point to
features of such cases that require innovative remedial techniques. In-
stitutional reform litigation may be different, and it may be difficult,
83. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword" The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1, 5 (1979).
84. Johnson, supra note 79, at 274; see Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary andthe Extraordi-
nary in Institutional Reform Litigation, 93 HARv. L. REv. 465 (1980).
85. Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 737, 743 (6th Cir. 1979).
86. Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth., 379 Mass. 703, 741, 400 N.E.2d 1231, 1253 (1980).
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but it is not impossible. The differences can be accommodated. Re-
sources are available: "proven experts" 87 can help solve problems.
Masters and receivers can be utilized. 88 No doubt the remedial stage is
the hardest-and especially because of the intransigence of the organi-
zational defendants in complying with the mandate of the court-but
the judiciary is sufficiently adaptable. It can bend and stretch its proce-
dures-indeed, it must do so89-and at the remedial stage there is less
danger of doing violence to the judicial process by moving flexibly "be-
yond the traditional judicial role."90 At that point, "in actively shaping
and monitoring the decree, mediating between the parties, developing
his own sources of expertise and information, the trial judge has passed
beyond even the role of legislator and has become a policy planner and
manager." 91
There are times when lore makes law. What I have described is
the emerging lore of litigation for organizational change: it must be
done; it can be done; it can be done principally by overcoming obsta-
cles set up by the defendants and by using unconventional devices; and
it can be done with little impact on the judiciary itself. Here is a credo
at once rational and skeptical, intolerant of flexibility, discretion, and
expertise in the organizations subject to judicial supervision but ex-
ceedingly trustful of all three when employed in the service of the
court. Indeed, central to what is fast becoming the received wisdom is
the need for expertise in shaping and enforcing remedies, for judicial
discretion in framing and monitoring novel remedial devices, and for
flexibility in adapting the machinery of the courts to the job. The old
virtues have found a new home.
II. THE CHARACTER OF THE JUDICIAL TASK
The use of litigation to effect change in large, complex, ongoing,
public institutions is a more hazardous venture than it is frequently
made out to be. Several aspects of the judicial perspective contribute to
the problematic character of the enterprise. So, too, do the nature and
behavior of public institutions, both in and outside of litigation. Insti-
tutional reform litigation has elements of a shadow play, and never
more so than when the practice of adjudication meets the behavior of
organizations.
87. Coffin, supra note 79, at 997.
88. Johnson, supra note 79, at 274; see Coffin, supra note 79, at 986.
89. See Coffin, supra note 79, at 993.
90. Id at 985.




The point is best made by illustration, beginning with the way
courts characterize problems and running through a variety of assump-
tions they indulge in the course of this litigation.
A. Idenifying the Issues.
Courts speak the language of legal fights. It is the language we
expect them to speak, and it is the language that frames their charter to
speak at all. Accordingly, in prison reform cases, or mental hospital
reform cases, or welfare reform cases, or housing reform cases, courts
have declared legal rights and identified the denial of those rights as
the basis for action. Of course, every decisionmaker plays a creative
role in identifying and labeling a problem as one kind of problem or
another. Decisionmakers are much influenced by their standard reper-
toire in how they choose to identify a problem. So it is to be expected
that courts will label institutional problems as raising issues involving
rights.
But suppose, instead, we label the problem a matter of resources
and we conclude that a prison or housing case does not involve a denial
of rights but a deficiency of finance. Naturally, the two are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive, for inadequate resources might produce a de-
nial of rights; but whether the analysis rests on the one or the other
makes enormous practical differences. If the problem is a resource
problem, it will be more difficult to argue that it is a problem for the
courts at all. If, despite casting the problem in terms of resources, it is a
problem for the courts, then the appropriate defendants are not neces-
sarily the administrative body and its officials but the legislators who
appropriate funds. And the issue may not be how to restore rights that
have been denied but how much funding is appropriate, especially in
relation to competing needs.
Or, again, suppose, in a mental hospital, the problem is not identi-
fied in terms of rights but in terms of appropriate therapy. The inquiry
will be different, the parties might be different, the considerations that
go into a decision will surely be different, and so will the remedy. One
can produce various hybrids of these: the "right to treatment" is the
most common formulation. 92 But it leads immediately to further ques-
tions. What is the appropriate treatment? How does a court choose
among contending schools of therapeutic intervention? How does it
guard against freezing into law what are really ephemeral doctrines
and dogmas of professions groping toward understanding? And how
92. See Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); New York State Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
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far must a court follow a decree embodying some such standards to
adjudicate secondary consequences-that is, the consequences of the
consequences of the decree?
An example of these dilemmas is readily at hand. In New York
State Association of Retarded Children v. Carey,93 a district court ap-
proved a consent decree that required officials operating the Willow-
brook facility for the mentally retarded to "ready each resident. . . for
life in the community at large. ' 94 This decree was very much a product
of the prevailing wisdom that "deinstitutionalization" and "main-
streaming" (placement in the community) of the retarded are generally
preferable to their confinement. As a result of the decree, some 1000
Willowbrook residents were relocated in the community. Those of
school age were enrolled in the public schools. It then developed that
about forty of those school children were carriers of serum hepatitis.
After consultation with specialists in that disease, the board of educa-
tion ordered retarded children who were carriers to be excluded from
the public schools. The next day, suit was brought by the state commis-
sioner of the office of mental retardation to enjoin the board's action.
The new action was consolidated with the main Willowbrook case.
The district court then held that the board acted unlawfully, where-
upon the board developed a plan to place the hepatitis carriers in sepa-
rate classes. This, too, the district court held to be unlawful.95
Affirming, the court of appeals decided that the health hazard posed by
the carriers was remote, whereas the harm to them that might result
from changing classes and having fewer curriculum options was poten-
tially significant.
96
The implication of a right to treatment in the Willowbrook case
was acceptance of a particular expert view of how such problems
should be handled. Once this was implemented, it later became neces-
sary to evaluate various alternatives, the appropriateness of which de-
pended upon assessment of two competing sets of unknowns: medical
uncertainties about a disease whose transmission is imperfectly under-
stood, on the one hand, and, on the other, educational imponderables
about the likely impact of one or another classroom arrangement on
learning-impaired pupils. The court essentially followed the children
out of the institution and into the schools. As it did, new fields of ex-
pertise became relevant to evaluation of second-order consequences.
93. 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
94. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 646 (2d Cir. 1979).
95. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 479, 486 (E.D.N.Y.
1978), af'd, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979).
96. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 650 (2d Cir. 1979).
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What began as a case involving a custodial institution had become a
case involving schools and public health practice. And the court ended
by overruling professional judgment on both counts.
Comparable dilemmas exist in certain school desegregation cases.
If the right is to an integrated classroom, then the transportation of
pupils to achieve that end is appropriate. Suppose, on the other hand,
a court asks why a school has become segregated. It may conclude that
residential patterns are responsible. If it does, then its order may deal
as much with housing as with the school.97 The definition of the issue
dictates the direction of the response and the scope of the resulting
remedy.
In all of these cases, the choice is essentially between defining the
issue narrowly, in terms of rights, and defining it broadly, in terms of
resources, therapy, policy, or the etiology of a social problem. There is,
in many cases, no real exit from this dilemma. Casting the issue nar-
rowly risks a significant degree of unrealism in the diagnosis of the
underlying problem and the prescription formulated for it, although it
preserves the fiction that this is a lawsuit like any other. Casting the
issue broadly risks judicial involvement in a host of issues far from
those initially before the court and far from those with which most
courts feel comfortable. Courts have gone both ways, and both courses
tend eventually to bring home in different ways the lesson that these
cases are not principally about legal rights but about a great many
other things: resources, costs and benefits, competing social goals, and
professional judgment, to name a few.98
B. Identifying the Parties.
Here there are five assumptions typically indulged by the courts-
and often incorrectly: first, that the plaintiffs have discernible, homoge-
neous interests; second, that the defendants are officials of organiza-
tions with an identifiable and coherent structure; third, that the relevant
organizations are before the court; fourth, that the defendant organiza-
tions have more or less consistent interests; and, fifth, that plaintiffs and
defendants are on opposite sides of the case.
1. Heterogeneity Among Plaintiffs. It has been remarked fairly
frequently that plaintiffs often have interests and preferences that di-
97. See Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 752-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1974),further
proceedings at 383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), a27'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).




verge one from another.99 This observation is entirely accurate. More-
over, the divergence of interest often shapes the course of the litigation.
In a desegregation case, 100 for example, two classes of plaintiffs differed
in their view of housing issues. Minority plaintiffs wanted first priority
for local residents in new housing, while white plaintiffs wanted to use
the new units to attract higher income people from outside the area. 101
Largely because of their inability to compose such differences, the
plaintiffs focused not on housing, but on the composition of the school.
2. The Coherence of Government Bodies. On the defendants'
side, the matter is far more subtle, because it involves characteristic
patterns of administrative agency behavior that have been uncovered
by students of organization theory and bureaucratic politics. Although
our law tends to assume that an administrative agency is a coherent
organization, more or less centrally directed and therefore amenable to
a change of direction, in point of fact such organizations are often far
from coherent and far from centrally directed. They are sustained by
relations with various external constituencies (legislators, executives,
various client groups) and typically are composed of a variety of fac-
tions and interests internally. Often internal factions are linked to par-
ticular external interests. As these linkages and divisions may outlast
even protracted litigation, they are formidable constraints with which
courts must contend. What looks like a solidary body may turn out to
be a constellation of bodies over which central control is elusive. The
implications of organizational fragmentation are discussed below.
3. The Completeness of the Parties. Quite apart from the hetero-
geneity of seemingly homogeneous organizations, it can by no means
be assumed that all the relevant bodies are before the court. Consider
the Boston school system, long the subject of desegregation litiga-
tion.102 The charter of the school system empowered the school com-
mittee to appropriate the same funds in any fiscal year as had been
appropriated the year before. But, if additional funds were sought, the
concurrence of non-parties, the mayor and city council, was required.
New appropriations required by court order set in motion a joint budg-
eting process, and the expenditure of funds had to be jointly certified
99. See, e.g., Wilton, Functional Interest Advocacy in Modern Complex Litigation, 60 WASH.
U.L.Q. 37 (1982).
100. See Hart v. Community School Bd., 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
101. Berger, Awayfrom the Court House and into the Field- The Odyssey of a Special Master,
78 COLUM. L. REv. 707, 726 n.21 (1978).
102. Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977).
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by the city auditor and the school system business manager.103 To be
subject to a decree and to have formal authority to carry it out are not
necessarily the same as being able to carry it out alone.
Indeed, because legal concepts of responsibility are predominantly
formal, whereas organizational behavior is so heavily affected by an
array of informal relationships, unpredictability stalks the manner in
which a decree will be implemented. In Hobson v. Hansen,' °4 for ex-
ample, a federal district judge ordered the equalization of expenditures
per pupil on teachers' salaries and benefits from school to school within
a single school system. The court envisioned that older and more high-
ly paid classroom teachers would then be more equally distributed
through the system. What happened was quite different. For some
years after the decree was entered, the system was able to comply with-
out transferring classroom teachers. Instead, it shifted around itinerant
and lower-seniority special-subject teachers (those teaching peripheral
or enrichment subjects). In choosing this mode of meeting the require-
ments of the decree, the system was much influenced by its obligations
under a collective bargaining agreement. The teachers' union, which
was not a party to the suit-and legally did not have to be-played a
powerful and wholly uncontemplated role in the way the decree was
effectuated.105
This important point needs to be put more generally. Even in a
complex lawsuit with many parties, it is quite likely that some major
actors in the field have been left out of the litigation. By labeling a
controversy a legal question, the judicial process simplifies the issues
and the parties. Parties excluded from participation in the litigation by
this definition of the issue are likely to appear again later, at the imple-
mentation stage, at which point their participation may thwart, deflect,
or otherwise impinge upon the implementation of the decree, often pro-
ducing unintended consequences and preventing the attainment of in-
tended consequences.
4. Heterogeneity Among Defendants. To the extent that there is
more than one defendant-organization before the court-and there
usually is-it cannot be assumed that the defendants all have the same
view of the litigation or of any issue in it. Quite the contrary. Govern-
103. Wood, Professionals at Bay: Managing Boston's Public Schools, 1 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 454, 463 (1982).
104. 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971).
105. D. HoRowrTz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 146-49 (1977).
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mental bodies will typically respond according to their varying inter-
ests, and their responses may change over time.10 6
The difficulties this can cause are well illustrated by Mills v. Board
of Education,17 a "right to education" case in which a federal district
court ordered city and school officials to provide education for pupils
previously excluded from the schools because they were disorderly, dis-
turbed, retarded, or hyperactive. Two government bodies were princi-
pally affected: the city Department of Human Resources, responsible
for children who were wards of the court, and the school system, re-
sponsible for pupils who could be placed in nonresidential school pro-
grams. Neither agency, however, was willing to take responsibility for
children who were not wards of the court but needed residential care.
The result was a stalemate that activated a dormant bureaucratic dis-
pute, delayed implementation of the decree, and placed the judge in the
role of mediator between warring organizations. 10 8
5. Friendly Persuasion: The Problem of Defendants Who Would
Like to Lose. There is an excellent possibility that some of the gov-
ernmental defendants agree with the arguments advanced by the plain-
tiffs--or, more properly, since these are often lawyer-controlled cases
with merely nominal plaintiffs, agree with the arguments advanced by
the plaintiffs' lawyers and their expert witnesses. Among lawyers and
experts, there may well be elements of a professional consensus at work
on both sides. There is commonly also a desire on the part of some
officials to use a decree entered against them as a weapon in the polit-
ical struggle to vindicate their view of the appropriate treatment, reha-
bilitation, or other policy goal for the institution. An adverse decree
that would require additional spending is also a weapon used by offi-
cials to augment their budget. Occasionally, the anticipated budgetary
increases are thwarted, 0 9 but very often they are not. Whether the
defendants' friendly view of the suit derives from policy preferences or
budgetary aspirations, the decree becomes a shortcut around political
constraints. 110
This is one reason why so many consent decrees are entered in
institutional reform cases. Nominal defendants are sometimes happy
106. For an example, see M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
COURTS 75-122 (1982).
107. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
108. D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 272 (1977).
109. Id at 258-59.
110. Cf. Diver, The Judge as PoliticalPowerbroker Superintending Structural Change in Public
Institutions, 65 VA. L. Rav. 43, 87 (1979).
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to be sued and happier still to lose.II' There is an added burden on the
courts if they perceive the defendants' posture accurately and if they
move beyond what is likely to be their initial reaction-that if even the
defendants are agreeable to the remedy requested by the plaintiffs that
must be the remedy the angels themselves would decree. In addition to
the usual problems attendant upon this litigation, difficult enough in
themselves, there are, then, the problems that arise from the use of the
lawsuit by officials seeking to escape political accountability.11 2 The
more such strategies succeed, the more frequently they will be em-
ployed. For, if litigation results in augmented expenditures for the los-
ing agency, then programs not in litigation will suffer as a result of their
inability to bring political pressure to bear on the legislature.
C. Identifying the Goals of Judicial Intervention.
The traditional model of the lawsuit is that it is an event with a
beginning, a middle, and an end. The beginning comprises the state-
ment of the claim and the raising of issues; the middle entails the reso-
lution of the legal and factual issues; the end is defined by the issuance
of an order and compliance with it. Since I am concerned here with the
matter of judicial supervision of administration, it is the end of the liti-
gation that I should like to highlight. Accurate as it is to describe a
great deal of conventional litigation, at no point is the traditional
model more out of joint with organizational behavior than at the post-
decree stage.
The assumptions carried by the traditional model into institutional
reform litigation are easily stated. A decree, when rendered, demands
compliance. If the requirements of a decree are not fulfilled, there
must be noncompliance, typically because of "bureaucratic intransi-
gence." To achieve compliance, some combination of coercion (or
threat of coercion), persistence, and expertise-the latter two often em-
bodied in the person of a special master-is necessary. Once bureau-
cratic obstacles are overcome, the goals of the decree should be
achieved, and the requisite change implemented.
On every count, organization theory and experience are contrary
111. In a book I wrote on government lawyers, I entitled a section on a comparable phenome-
non, "Better to Have Litigated and Lost Than Never to Have Litigated At All." D. HoRowrrz,
THE JUROCRACY: GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, AGENCY PROGRAMS, AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 84-90
(1977).
112. Against such efforts, the federal courts evolved rules to offset the possibility that, "by
means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as
to the constitutionality of the legislative act." Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S.
339, 345 (1892). Compare Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 360 (1981)(Brennan, J., concurring).
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to these assumptions. 13 No doubt compliance was a major problem in
the early desegregation cases, but it is not the major problem any more.
As previously indicated, many of the defendants are at least sympa-
thetic to the objectives of the decree. Whether they are or not, what
typically happens after a decree is rendered is that a host of forces and
interests, only some of them represented in the litigation, comes into
play. Depending on the character of the affected institution, these may
be parents, unions, professional organizations, interest groups, or polit-
ical leaders in the executive or legislature. As I have noted, an adminis-
trative agency is only nominally a single organization. In fact, it is
dependent on many others in the environment in which it functions to
fulfill its mission. In the school equalization case, discussed above, the
preexisting contract between the school system and the teachers' union
had a pronounced impact on the way the system complied with the
decree, although neither the union nor the terms of the contract had
been before the court. In the Boston school desegregation case, the
court's effort to involve the community in the selection of school ad-
ministrators in order to "break up the 'old boy' network. . . was easily
subverted in practice through the process of bullet voting by the sepa-
rate constituencies."'1 4 The decree was complied with, but the goal
was unfulfilled. Not compliance or noncompliance, but mode of com-
pliance, determines the impact of a decree. And mode of compliance is
dependent on the interplay of actors whose behavior is usually beyond
the anticipation and often beyond the reach of the court issuing the
decree.
Accordingly, the problem is not how to coerce the organization
into compliance. Like others who issue complex orders, the actions of
courts inevitably must "reflect the realities of partial enforcement."'" 5
Courts have, of course, discovered this, as they have detected the need
to readjust their decrees at later stages to cope with unforeseen condi-
tions. But it has not been an easy lesson. Many courts still speak of the
need to cut through bureaucracy to achieve goals stated in absolute
terms. Often the only way to reconcile the world of multiple organiza-
tional constraints with the desire for full enforcement has been to chop
up the legal requirements imposed into small, measurable pieces-in a
113. For a general view from the perspective of "enforcement," see DiverA Theory ofRegula-
tory Enforcement, 28 PUB. PoL'Y 257 (1980). See also A. ETZIONI, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS (rev. ed. 1975); H. KAUFMAN, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATIONAL
CHANGE (1971); H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1976); Note, Judicial Intervention
and Organization Theory: Changing Bureaucratic Behavior and Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 513 (1980).
114. Wood, Professionals at Bay: Managing Boston'r Public Schools, 1 J. PoL'Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 454, 462 (1982).
115. Diver, A Theory ofRegulatory Enforcement, 28 PUB. POL'Y 257, 259 (1980).
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prison, for example, so many square feet of living space, so many in-
mates to each physician, and so on.
Then, too, the notion that a lawsuit is a finite piece of business,
with a clearly-defined end, has not been easy to reconcile with the exi-
gencies of organizational change litigation. Only slowly and reluc-
tantly have courts, accustomed to a varied diet of lawsuits that actually
terminate, become adjusted to the idea that organizational change is
not a finite matter, that institutional reform cases do not seem to have a
clear end-point. There has been much impatience and occasionally in-
temperance along the way to this realization, and many of the issues
raised by the use of special masters, discussed below, revolve around
the desire of the court finally to work its will on the organization. The
diffuse, fluid character of organizational behavior has proved a very
frustrating matter to courts accustomed to ascertaining "the facts," de-
ciding the case, and counting on "compliance." A principal result of a
fair number of decrees has been, not compliance or its absence, but
further proceedings." 6 Many cases have proved to be, like the Willow-
brook litigation, chameleon cases, ever-new, ever-changing, never-
ending.
Interestingly enough, the complaint of administrators is not that
there are too many subsequent proceedings, including modifications of
the original decree, but rather too few: they complain that they are
bound by orders with which they cannot comply, because the litigation
setting is not fluid enough to cope with a changing environment.
117
The perspectives of the courts and of the organizations they seek to
change are, in the nature of things, radically different.
D. Masters, Machinery, and the Willingness to Innovate.
The complexity and time-consuming character of judicial supervi-
sion of administrative bodies have led courts to innovate in enforce-
ment mechanisms. Among the more common devices is appointment
of a special master, a monitor, a review committee, or, in more extreme
cases, a receiver to take over administration of the agency. I have re-
counted above how the contours of Rule 53 have been reshaped to per-
mit employment of masters, even after entry of the decree and for tasks
other than fact-finding. But what have such adjunct officials done, and
what is their significance for this litigation and for the courts that ap-
pointed them?
116. See, e.g., M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICYMAKING AND THE COURTS 122
(1982).
117. Wood, Professionals at Bay. Managing Boston's Public Schools, 1 J. Pofy ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 454, 462 (1982).
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Masters have been appointed for a variety of purposes at several
stages of the litigation: to propose the terms of a decree, either initially
or after earlier proposals had been rejected; to cope with anticipated
resistance to the decree; to supervise compliance with the decree; to
negotiate with actors whose cooperation would be necessary to secure
implementation; to advise and assist the defendant organization; to
monitor the conduct of the organization and provide intelligence to the
judge about its behavior; to be alert to the need to amend the decree;
and to resolve disputes over the meaning of the decree." 8
Sometimes the terms of appointment have been exceedingly
broad. In a Rhode Island prison case, a master was empowered to
monitor compliance with the decree. 19 For this purpose, he was ac-
corded unlimited access to the facilities at any hour; he was permitted
to conduct confidential interviews with prison staff and prisoners, to
attend staff meetings, and to recommend transfer of staff members and
the hiring of new employees. Other masters have essentially provided
themselves a broad charter. In the Coney Island school case,' 20 the
special master employed to propose a remedial plan proceeded to con-
duct no hearings. Instead, he hired a research assistant, met with com-
munity groups and the mayor, sat at the feet of a Ford Foundation
program officer working in the field of his concern, and cooperated ex-
tensively with the defendants in framing his recommendation. 12' Ac-
knowledging that this cooperation "ignored. . . the quasi-adversarial
relationship between the court . . . and the various agencies,"' 22 he
concluded that the investigation and negotiation in which he engaged
were nonetheless necessary to the "legislative" task of shaping "sys-
temic change."' 123 In short, masters are appointed to make good the
deficiencies of the judicial process in coping with complex
organizations.
There is the rub. Precisely because masters sense the need to act
unconventionally, they test the boundaries of judicial propriety. They
sometimes engage in what would clearly be improper ex parte commu-
118. Kirp & Babcock, Judge and Company: Court-Appointed Masters, School Desegregation,
and Inrsitutional Reform, 32 ALA. L. REv. 313 (1981); Nathan, The Use of Masters in Institutional
Reform Litigation, 10 U. TOL. L. REa. 419 (1979).
119. See Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 989 (D.R.I. 1977), aft'd, 616 F.2d 598 (lst
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980).
120. Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), supplemented, 383 F.
Supp. 769 (1974), aI'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
121. BergerAway From The Court House and into the Field- The Odyssey of a Special Master,
78 COLUM. L. REv. 707 (1978).
122. Id at 723.
123. Id at 738.
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nications if engaged in by the judge. If they rely more heavily on one
side or the other for information or for cooperation in drafting a plan,
they risk the appearance or the reality of lost neutrality. If they hire
subordinate personnel, they delegate some part of their function, thus
removing the judge a second step from the action taken. If they use
their power to interview staff members, to recommend staff changes, or
to give orders to staff on operational matters, they may intrude unduly
into administration and raise questions of organizational accountability
and lines of authority.'2 4 If, in monitoring a decree, they commit them-
selves to a certain view of who is responsible for shortfalls in imple-
mentation, they risk partisan commitment, in which they may also
entangle the judge if he accepts their view of the matter, even after a
formal hearing.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, it turns out that appointing courts
occasionally disown what the master has done or proposed.125 The un-
conventional character of the initial appointment leads to unconven-
tional behavior, for organizational change cases are different from the
normal run of cases. What masters propose sometimes appears too am-
bitious or too risky or too politically entangling to the judges who ap-
pointed them.
Appellate courts have also been somewhat cautious in reviewing
the employment of masters. In the Willowbrook case, for instance, a
district court held the governor and state controller in contempt for
failing to fund a seven-member "review panel" empowered to oversee
implementation of a consent decree. The state officials had requested
funding, but the legislature did not comply. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed the contempt finding, holding that the gov-
ernor was not obliged to expend unappropriated funds. 126 In a signifi-
cant footnote, the court added that it did not necessarily "agree with
the view that a federal court properly exercises its function when it
takes upon itself the supervision of a state institution like Willowbrook
Development Center," for that is a time-consuming responsibility. 27
Similarly, in an Alabama prison case, the Fifth Circuit declined to ap-
prove a thirty-nine member "Human Rights Committee," plus consul-
tants and clerical staff, appointed by the district court to monitor
124. Cf. Wood, Professionals at Bay: Managing Boston's Public Schools, 1 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 454, 462 (1982) ("Court experts gave oral instructions to key officers in the school de-
partment, who understandably were uncertain as to whether they worked for the experts, the
court, or the superintendent.").
125. Kirp & Babcock, Judge and Company: Court-Appointed Masters, School Desegregation,
and Institutional Reform, 32 ALA. L. Rnv. 313, 370 (1981).
126. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1980).
127. Id at 166 n.3.
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implementation of its decree. 128 The court of appeals was apparently
concerned about two things. First, it was troubled by the size and
therefore likely intrusiveness of the body. Second, the court sensed that
the breadth of the committee's mandate ("to take any action reasonably
necessary") was conducive to the committee's taking over administra-
tion of the prison, which, the court noted, "appears to have oc-
curred."'129 The court of appeals noted in passing the assertion of state
officials that "prison authorities and their counsel were not notified of
meetings between committee members and the District Court with ref-
erence to prison operations; therefore, state counsel were unable to par-
ticipate or to be heard."'
30
Masters are still readily appointed and approved. Where skepti-
cism has surfaced, its source has been the desire to avoid intrusiveness
in administration and to supersede administrative officials only as a last
resort. The appellate courts have been concerned with the potential for
deep and unending involvement of district courts in the affairs of pub-
lic institutions. Although the oblique reference to ex parte communica-
tions in the Alabama case suggests some uneasiness, the courts have
been much less concerned with the feedback impact of masters,
monitors, and receivers on the courts and on the integrity of judicial
proceedings.
Quite the contrary, in fact. The courts have been insufficiently dil-
igent about protecting themselves in this respect. Two cogent examples
can be cited, one a recent case, the other a recent set of proposals.
In a case arising in the Massachusetts courts, the Supreme Judicial
Court approved the appointment of a receiver to take over administra-
tion of the Boston Housing Authority.' 3' At the same time, the court
reviewed certain ex parte conversations the trial judge had had with the
receiver. Such conversations, the court noted, should not have oc-
curred. But, on the other hand, said the court, it is only "natural" that
they did occur: this, after all, was "massive, long-continuing litigation
which has approximated the type involving institutional reform."'
32
Citing academic commentators who have described the role of the
judge as manager, the opinion goes on to explain: "Necessarily the
judge becomes interested in operational problems and it is understand-
able that he should begin to act the part of an operator with perhaps
128. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 288-90 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915
(1978).
129. 559 F.2d at 289.
130. Id (emphasis deleted).
131. Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth., 379 Mass. 703, 400 N.E.2d 1231 (1980).
132. Id at 741, 400 N.E.2d at 1253.
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reduced attention to such conventional safeguards as bilaterality."' 33
"Bilaterality," it should be understood, is a euphemism for confronta-
tion and cross-examination and other procedures to avoid ex parte
communications. In the same tolerant spirit, the court turned aside ob-
jections to the trial judge's vehement criticism of the Boston Housing
Authority in the later stages of the litigation. This vehemence was pro-
duced, according to the appellate court, "by the judge's frustration at
what he took to be the poor reaction of the BHA people to his orders
and directions and latterly to the requirements of the consent decree
"134
What the Boston housing case illustrates, in addition to the obvi-
ous dangers of ex parte communications and of delegation of judicial
functions to masters and receivers, is the tendency noted earlier for
courts to assume that, if a decree is not fully effective, bureaucratic
resistance must be the reason. As the court becomes committed to at-
taining the result posited by the decree, there is a substantial risk that
the court will become a partisan in a struggle to bring the bureaucracy
to heel. All of these are formidable dangers posed by institutional re-
form litigation for the integrity of the judicial process. Extraordinary
cases seem to demand extraordinary measures, but extraordinary meas-
ures may, in the end, contaminate the handling of ordinary cases. Pre-
sumably, there are sharp limits to the extent the functioning of courts
will be unaffected by ex parte communications and by judges who act
as partisan "operators" in the enforcement of their decrees.
The proposals are those made by Judge Frank M. Coffin, who has
suggested major procedural changes to accommodate the exigencies of
organizational change litigation. 135 He is prepared to permit an
"outside expert judge" to sit in on the remedial phase, since ex parte
"influence would not seem to be of as much concern at the remedial
stage as when liability is at issue."'136 Judge Coffin also recommends
that appellate judges "sit in on critical arguments [in the trial court],
absorb the atmosphere, gain a better appreciation of the problem, and
help inform the court of appeals so that it could play a more sensitive
role."' 37 Likewise, Judge Coffin would sanction conferences between
trial and appellate judges before the trial judge decides on a remedy, 38
and he advocates the participation of the trial judge as "a resource per-
133. Id at 742, 400 N.E.2d at 1254.
134. Id at 740-41, 400 N.E.2d at 1253.
135. Coffin, The Frontier of Remedies: A Callfor Exploration, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 983 (1979).
136. Id at 996.
137. Id
138. Id at 990.
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son" at the appellate argument. 139 He is ready to adapt existing institu-
tions in dramatic ways to make possible inquisitorial procedures by
trial judges and to make available to them "the help of proven ex-
perts."'14 Frustration with the inadequacy of the courts to cope with
organizational change litigation has thus generated a willingness to
tinker with procedure in quite fundamental ways, with very little
awareness that such changes might redound to the disadvantage of the
system as a whole.
The earlier apprehensions about the liberal employment of special
masters are not entirely dissipated, but they have been much diluted. In
the enthusiasm to manage organizational change, courts, although fear-
ful of becoming too involved in administrative matters, have largely
forgotten the dangers to the integrity of the judicial function that inhere
in ex parte communications, in delegation of the duty to decide from
judges to their nominees, and in even temporary abandonment of the
appearance of judicial neutrality. The courts have begun to assume
that, to do the job effectively, they require more in the way of machin-
ery-more "experts," more masters and monitors, more consultants-
and this in a judicial system that has thrived on an absence of machin-
ery. Courts may or may not succeed in reforming bureaucracies, but in
the course of trying they may end up transforming themselves. In the
United States, it has always been clear that what a court has decided, a
judge has personally decided. In the end, too much machinery between
the court and the case puts at risk a distinctive feature of the American
judicial system, namely, that litigants obtain the compulsory attention
of judges.
It would be wise, therefore, not to let frustration with organiza-
tional change litigation propel too much enthusiasm for procedural in-
novation. There is every reason to be sparing about the use of masters,
receivers, monitors, experts, and consultants, lest the judiciary, in re-
forming bureaucracies, join their ranks. The assumption of procedural
malleability is quite accurate. Our courts can be what we want them to
be and do what we want them to do. But they cannot be and do every-
thing. Even if alterations like those proposed promised enhanced ca-
pacity for institutional reform cases-a doubtful proposition, given
what I have suggested are the main reasons for the difficulty of these
cases-this benefit would likely come at the cost of impairing the over-
all credibility and capacity of the system.




III. THE COURT AS MANAGER: TOWARD A FULLER ACCOUNTING
Something important has been happening that has not quite been
identified in the profuse literature on organizational reform litigation.
The trial judge has been celebrated as "the creator and manager of
complex forms of ongoing relief,"' 4 ' the one in whom responsibility is
lodged to "remove the threat posed to our constitutional values by a
large-scale organization"' 42 or, more pointedly, "to control the bureau-
cracies of a complex, modem society."' 4 3 Some such role conception
has combined with an implicit model of organizational behavior that
emphasizes bureaucratic recalcitrance to produce an inclination on the
part of judges to work their will against all obstacles. This has pro-
duced, in turn, a fundamental alteration in the criteria by which judi-
cial decisions are to be judged and an investment of courts in the
outcome of controversies on a scale not previously experienced in the
United States.
In the so-called conventional case, in which the remedy is simple
and follows naturally from the rights of the parties, great care is taken
in declaring those rights. In evaluating such a judicial decision, we typ-
ically ask whether or not it is right. To be sure, many complexities are
concealed in that question. A decision may be right because it is in
accordance with preexisting law. Or it may be right because it squares
with purposes embodied in some underlying legal doctrine. A decision
may be right because it responds to some ethical imperative or to the
needs of the parties or because it fits the social milieu in which it will
have an impact. Still, the touchstone of evaluation is rightness.
Not quite so in organizational change cases. There the decree is
complex; it often does not follow naturally from the declared right, and
perhaps it should not. 1 "4 The main question is whether the remedy is
apt to bring about the intended result, whether the court can husband
sufficient resources to compel or catalyze the desired change. In short,
the focus is not on rightness alone but also on effectiveness. There has
been a pronounced shift from moral to managerial criteria of evalua-
tion of judicial decisions.
The courts themselves have perceived this, which is why they
devote so much attention to enforcing their decrees and why they have
141. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1284
(1976).
142. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 7erm-Foreword" The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv.
1, 17 (1979).
143. Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term - Foreword- Public Law Litigation and the Bur-
ger Court, 96 HARV. L. REv. 4, 60 (1982).
144. See id at 51-52.
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been willing to be flexible and experimental with devices to that end.
Because of this altered focus and also simply because of the drawn-out,
time-consuming, frustrating character of the litigation, a good many
judges have become invested in the outcome of the litigation. They
want the bureaucracy to change, and they are inclined to regard a fail-
ure to change as an indication of defiance for which a response is re-
quired. And, so, as in the Boston Housing Authority case, we have
witnessed trial judges who become vehemently partisan, because they
are "interested in operational problems."'145 Since enforcement is a key
process in institutional reform litigation, and the judge plays a major
role in it, compromises in judicial neutrality must be expected.
Now this might be an acceptable price to pay if it did not entail a
significant loss in comparative advantage. Most close observers would
agree, I think, that courts are generally rather good at applied moral
reasoning of the sort they are called upon to perform in conventional
adjudication. There is no reason to expect, however, that the least-
bureaucratized of the branches of government-and the one most ac-
customed to automatic, unswerving obedience to orders-will be par-
ticularly adept at management tasks. The courts have a comparative
advantage when it comes to adjudicating rights; they have none when it
comes to enforcing complex remedies.
Moreover, despite the willingness of courts to innovate in handling
this litigation, they are still very much courts, bound for the most part
by a process devised for the adjudication of individual disputes and not
especially apt for coping with large questions of policy and administra-
tion. This is not the place to identify the range of fact-finding and im-
pact-forecasting problems created by the imperfect fit between an old
process and a new set of demands placed on it. I have analyzed these
extensively elsewhere. 146 But two problematic aspects of organiza-
tional change litigation call for special mention, for they are both spe-
cific to the supervision of public institutions and inherent in the judicial
mode of proceeding. One has to do with the financial ramifications of
institutional reform decrees. The other involves the matter of unin-
tended consequences. I have alluded to both earlier. Still, I want to
underscore here the capricious character of outcomes on both of these
dimensions, for it bears on what we might, in the end, think of the work
of the courts in this area.
When a court decrees that a housing authority, welfare agency,
prison system, or mental hospital must change the way in which it has
145. Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth., 379 Mass. 703, 742, 400 N.E.2d 1231, 1254 (1980).
146. D. HoRowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); Horowitz, The Courts as Guardi-
ans of the Public Interest, 37 PUB. AD. Rnv. 148 (1977).
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been operating, the changes required may necessitate the expenditure
of public funds. Since courts have largely been deaf to the argument
that funds are unavailable for compliance with such a decree, one of
two things can happen. Either the organization succeeds in extracting
new appropriations to meet the demands of the decree, or else it reallo-
cates existing funds for that purpose. If the former, there is what we
might call a leveling up. If the latter, there is a leveling down: that is,
some service or facility not implicated in the decree suffers an offsetting
diminution. Whether there is leveling up or leveling down is generally
not a function of how important the right declared by the court is or
how vital the affected service is. It is a function of political relation-
ships and pressures entirely extrinsic to any such judgment on the mer-
its. Administrators may collude with plaintiffs' lawyers in the hope of
budgetary augmentation, but that hope is not always fulfilled.147
Even if new funds are appropriated, that impact may have costs
elsewhere. Unless the court has succeeded in galvanizing public sup-
port for more expenditures overall, more funds appropriated for, say,
improved prison conditions may mean fewer funds for health care or
welfare assistance or some other need. Indeed, this is likely, unless
those programs, too, have been the subject of an adverse decree. To the
extent that courts are de facto participants in the budgetary process,
they order their budgetary priorities seriatim. They operate one case at
a time. They never need lay prison needs against welfare needs, be-
cause they work on the premise that they are declaring rights. If a
party has a right, it is not bounded by cost. But that is not how a right
is likely to be translated into the appropriations process. Budgeting is
not absolute; it is the most relative of processes, the polar opposite of
rights adjudication. Courts, however, see only the beneficiaries of their
decrees, never those who lose resources as a result.
This brings me to the more general subject of unintended conse-
quences in organizational change cases. As in the matter of budgetary
costs, these are of two types: those that occur within the affected organ-
ization and those that occur outside it. I have already suggested that,
after a decree is entered, a plethora of forces, many of them not before
the court, typically combine in unanticipated ways to produce results of
which courts may or may not approve but many of which they will
certainly not have foreseen. The same happens outside the bounds of
147. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 293-95 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring). In Mills v.
Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972), the school system had hoped that an adverse
decree would augment its budget, but a change of superintendents occurred, and the new adminis-
trators proved less adept at persuading city officials of the need for additional funds.
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the affected organization. These consequences never come within the
view of the courts.
Prison litigation provides an excellent example. Through the
1970's, there was a dramatic increase in decrees ordering the ameliora-
tion of prison conditions and the reduction of overcrowding. The de-
crees had a variety of effects, alone and in combination with other
forces. The conditions in which some prisoners were housed certainly
improved, but authorities sometimes were impelled to comply with ju-
dicially-imposed space requirements by shifting some prison inmates
into much less adequate local jails.148 Some prisoners were plainly
worse off after the decrees. In at least some state institutions, judicial
recognition of prisoners' rights seems also to have loosened the author-
ity and self-confidence of custodial personnel and concomitantly
strengthened the power of prison gangs, making inmates more vulnera-
ble to physical abuse. 149 One prisoner's right may be another's tor-
ment. As far as I know, no court has thought of prison reform
litigation in terms of offsetting costs and benefits.
Prison litigation and mandatory sentencing together produced an
unanticipated legislative response. By the end of the 1970's, individual
prisons or whole prison systems in some thirty-seven states were subject
to court order or pending litigation.1 50 The same decade witnessed the
enactment of mandatory sentencing statutes, also in as many as thirty-
seven states. 151 Prison reform decrees combined with determinate
sentences to put great pressure on existing prison facilities and to make
construction of new facilities look increasingly attractive to deci-
sionmakers. The result has been a prison building boom all around the
United States. Some 600 new correctional facilities were being con-
structed in forty-five states as of 1979, at a cost in excess of $3.5 bil-
lion.152 Courts had helped put corrections on the agenda of
legislatures, to be sure, but the response was a prison building program,
in part to avert adverse decrees. It hardly needs to be said that this is
not at all the way prison reformers wanted the issue to be framed in
state legislatures: they were interested in alternatives to incarceration,
in fewer prisons, not more. The courts and the new sentencing statutes
148. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CONDITIONS AND COSTS OF CONFINEMENT 163 (1980)
(volume 3 of the AMERICAN PRISONS AND JAILS series).
149. M. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, AFTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL DECREES IN
CORRECTIONAL SETTINGS 112-13, 408-09 (1977); Engel & Rothman, Prison Violence andthe Para-
dox of Reform, 73 PuB. INTEREST 91, 100-01 (1983).
150. See supra note 61.
151. W. BURGER, 1982 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY 6-7 (1983).
152. See Joy, State Prisons on Trial, 5 STATE LEGISLATURES 6 (1979).
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effectively preempted that whole issue, locking us into prisons until the
twenty-first century.
Now it is perfectly accurate to describe the judicial role in these
cases as managerial. But it is wrong to stop at the boundaries of the
defendant-organization. The judges, in fact, manage much more than
they know. And it is equally wrong to judge the efficacy of their efforts
by whether they have removed the "threat" posed by an organization
to "constitutional values" or whether they have "controlled the bureau-
cracy." For that would be to do exactly what the courts themselves
rather unrealistically do in this litigation: isolate pieces of transactions
and related institutions, act on a piece, and neglect the rest. Litigation
inevitably entails this sort of simplification. At such habits did T.R.
Powell aim his remark that "If you can think about something which is
attached to something else without thinking about what it is attached
to, then you have what is called a legal mind." If this turn of mind is
necessary in litigation, it certainly is not helpful in evaluating the effect
of litigation.
If we resist the tendency to evaluate organizational change litiga-
tion through the narrow-angle lens of compliance alone, some other
matters come prominently into the range of consideration. Among
these ishe likely impact of unconventional judicial enforcement prac-
tices on the courts themselves. Does the growing use of masters,
monitors, and receivers threaten the integrity of the judicial process be-
cause of the informal, ex parte way in which they operate or because of
the new personnel placed between the judge and the case? To what
extent should the proliferation of extensive decrees largely shielded
from appellate review by doctrines of remedial discretion or by the in-
sulation of technical fact-finding give cause for concern that single dis-
trict judges can order the reshaping of whole institutions? Do the
changing criteria for evaluating judicial decisions, from moral to mana-
gerial, put the courts in an untenable position, a position conducive to
judicial frustration and the loss of neutrality? When we consider these
matters, along with the unpredictable financial results of decrees, the
ability of parties not before the court to skew the implementation of
decrees in uncontemplated ways, and the unintended impact of judicial
intervention in other forums (such as legislatures)-when a more accu-
rate accounting of this kind is attempted, the emerging picture is simply
not in focus. Whether the courts have done more good than harm is a
question begging an answer at the moment. That they mean to do
good is beyond doubt. But, as Peter de Vries has observed, "The road
to good intentions is paved with hell."
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